

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPU #0016/01 0042039
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 042039Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1985
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0120
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0710
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0108
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0765
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL//OLE/OI//

S E C R E T PORT AU PRINCE 000016

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/PSC LUCY CHANG, LARRY MROZINSKI, AND DENNIS
HANKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2015
TAGS: [KPKO](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [HA](#)
SUBJECT: POST'S ASSESSMENT OF MINUSTAH PERFORMANCE

REF: A. 05 STATE 215210
[1](#)B. 05 PAP 2597
[1](#)C. 05 PAP 2940

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Timothy M. Carney for Reasons: 1.4 (b
and d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: MINUSTAH's performance has been mixed.
The mission has failed to make significant progress on the
security front in Cite Soleil, the police mission is only
partially integrated into the Haitian National Police (HNP),
its elections program has been mismanaged (leading to

additional delays) and its human rights effort remains
spotty. Nevertheless, MINUSTAH's mandate must be extended
February 15 to afford a newly-elected government the
opportunity to work together with the international community
towards creating a governable environment. Above all, the
mission needs more robust leadership and management. In the
short-term, we need to identify a deputy SRSG immediately and
start looking for an SRSG to replace Valdes once he leaves
after the elections. End Summary.

Security

[1](#)2. (S) The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti has had mixed
results in meeting its stated goals. Following a raid on
July 6, 2005, that neutralized gang leader Dread Wilme, the
overall security situation in the capital improved remarkably
(ref B). The number of gun-related deaths and the level of
gunfire has decreased. However, while the number of killings
dissipated, there has been a spike in the number of
kidnappings. They are largely criminal in nature.

[1](#)3. (S) MINUSTAH has found limited success in stabilizing
slum areas, including that of Bel-Air. The improvement in its
level of security has allowed residents to return after
earlier fleeing due to the violence (ref C). However, the
shanty town of Cite Soleil remains a no-go area. The
Jordanian peacekeepers have encircled the slum of 300,000
residents. However, a majority of kidnapping victims who are
freed report that their captors took them to Cite Soleil,
often passing peacekeepers and checkpoints along the way.
MINUSTAH has been the victim of three separate attacks
(resulting in two deaths) since December 16. Until MINUSTAH
military troops can create a permanent presence in Cite

Soleil, it will continue to be a bastion of criminality.

Elections

¶4. (C) While elections have officially only been delayed once, multiple dates have been unofficially discussed, fixed and discarded. On December 31, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), announced that the elections would be delayed beyond January 8 because of technical shortcomings, though they did not specify new dates for the contest. The recurring delays and numerous technical deficiencies in the electoral process have provided rhetorical firepower to parties that lack significant popular support and believe further delay will help improve their chances. While MINUSTAH is not solely responsible for delays and election failures, its inefficiency has contributed to the continuing problems. For example, after the CEP failed to choose the roughly 800 voting centers on time, MINUSTAH took over the task. However, many of the voting centers MINUSTAH chose were either too small to handle the number of voters assigned to them or MINUSTAH did not prepare contracts with proprietors to use their facilities as voting centers. Some centers did not exist at all.

¶5. (C) Further, the overall lack of elections administration experience or expertise has crippled MINUSTAH's ability to prepare for elections. In early December, MINUSTAH published a budget outlining roughly USD 13 million in additional expenses. However, the budget was so poorly presented and vague that the donors were unable to analyze MINUSTAH's projections or expenditures. The donors asked UN officials here to explain the budget and answer detailed questions in a subsequent meeting. However, the UN staff disagreed over basic facts including how much money was pledged versus received, where the UN had saved money, and which overruns were due to delays and which were due to unforeseen problems.

Human Rights

¶6. (SBU) MINUSTAH's human rights coordinator Thierry Fagart has had minimal impact here. Fagart has conducted several investigations on potential human rights violations, including the July 6 raid mentioned above, and the Haitian National Police's involvement in the August 20 Martissant soccer stadium incident resulting in at least six deaths. However, the UN has not made his reports public. Short visits undertaken by the UN's independent expert on human rights in Haiti, Louis Joint, have carried more weight, but there has been no tangible UN contribution to improving the human rights situation.

¶7. (C) Comment: Despite the mixed performance, Post strongly recommends that MINUSTAH's mandate be extended for an additional six months until August 15, 2006, and be prepared to stay longer should the newly-elected government request it to remain beyond that timeframe. UN headquarters should immediately provide more experienced technical staff to support its mission and send a team to audit the UN's budget. The UN's inability to respond to allegations of flagrant human rights abuse in the wake of its July 6 operation in Cite Soleil and UNDP's inability to produce a cogent elections budget are examples of poor performance that must end if the UN is to be successful in Haiti. End comment.
CARNEY